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ABSTRACT 
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR INFORMATION 
SHARING IN THE OIL INDUSTRY1' 
R. Mark Isaac 
Exploration for oil and natural gas often produces an 
information externality for other resource owners. In isolation, 
this arrangement can lead to suboptimal exploration patterns. 
However, private institutions have evolved in the oil industry to 
provide markets for the external information. In this paper, the 
exploration process is modeled in a game theoretic framework in 
which the existence and performa nce of the private trading 
institutions are examined. 
*This research was written partl y while the author was funded by the 
John Randol ph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation and partly while 
funded by the Cal tech Energy Policy Project. Many helpful comments 
were received from Professors John Ferejohn, Roger Noll, and James 
Quirk, and from the Economic Theory Workshop. 
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR 
INFORMATION SHARING IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
R. Mark Isaac 
California Institute of Technology 
Finding and producing petroleum is an inherently risky 
undertaking. In such an environment of uncertainty, information 
can be a valuable commodity. 1 There are several ways in which
an oil firm can obtain information about a prospect. There are 
2 
others. In this respect, as one firm, X, has a commodity (infor-
mation) which another firm, Y, values, there is the possibility 
of mutually beneficial exchange. However, oil field information 
often also has the property of " non-excludability" in which firm 
X is unable to prevent firm Y from sharing in the valuable inf or-
mation even if they do not agree upon terms of exchange. 
Information is thus often an external good. · F'or 
example, w hile a firm may be able to keep the results � se of 
a seismic survey private, if the firm acts upon the information 
in some particular way, say, by commencing drilling on a wildcat 
3 
prospect, the firm may " tip off" others. Likewise, the results 
of completed test drilling may not easily be kept secret. It 
is typically observed that successful discoveries on one lease 
well defined markets in which certain scientific measurements or 4 
records can be obtained (aerial photographs, seismic surveys, the 
labor market for geologists and geophysicists, etc. ) .  But, 
it is also true that the actual drilling, logging, coring, and 
2 
producing from a subsurface structure can provide information. 
An important feature of petroleum exploration and develop-
ment is that information obtained about one geological feature is 
often useful outside of a particular drilling site. Such infor-
mation can give a better picture not only of a portion of a poten-
tial stratum but also of the entire reservoir and even of entirely 
separate prospects with similar geological features. Thus, there 
are many opportunities for an oil company, through its ow n infor-
mation gathering procedures, to obtain information valuable to 
will drive up the value of surrounding acerage. This is an 
indication that the first discovering oil firm, if it does not 
already own all the relevant adj acent acerage, is giving away 
valuable information to others. In fact, one would expect that 
the mere initiation of drilling activity on land previously thought 
to be worthless would, by capitaliz ing the value of the expected 
future information, increase the value of the mineral rights of 
surrounding land. In these cases, surrounding lease owners are 
in the position of being " free riders" off the first person to begin 
drilling. 
This paper is concerned with a special case of such inf or-
mation externalities, namely those in which there is more than 
one firm ow ning "informationally related" prospects and in w hich 
3 
each firm has the opportunity to be a free rider in receiving 
information paid for by another. A simple example is depicted 
in Figure 1. The dotted.line indicates the boundaries of a geo-
logical formation. Firms A and B own or lease the mineral rights 
as depicted. Suppose that drilling a well on either property 
yeilds valuable information about both. Furthermore, suppose 
that the information obtained through drilling is not excludable, 
so A can gain information from drilling on B, and vice versa. If 
the external information flows are valuable, the model represents 
an interest conflict which I hope to model in the framework of 
game theory. This game theoretic model of two firms and "nature" 
is essentially the one employed by Stiglitz (1975) . 
Using this game theoretic model, it is easy to show that 
when the conflict takes the form of a noncooperative, nonconstant 
sum game, a suboptimal outcome can result. However, the more 
important part of this paper will be to examine the role of some 
"real world" institutions which Grayson calls "trading" arrange-
ments (Grayson 1960) . These institutions will be described in 
more detail in a later section, but the essential feature which 
will be modeled here is that they transform the noncooperative 
game, allowing it to be played as a cooperative game with side 
payments. In some instances, the existence of these trading 
arrangements allows the players to reach an optimal outcome. 
In an earlier paper, which does not specifically consider 
the existence of these trading institutions, Peterson argues that 
the presence of information externalities in exploration suggests 
the need for government subsidies (Peterson 1975).5 A similar 
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argument was made by Stiglitz (1975). To the extent that cooperative 
information sharing institutions ameliorate effects of the externality ,  
the need for government assistance i s  no longer indicated. However, 
it will be shown in this paper that the vol untary trading arrangements 
are not a cure-all . There are circumstances in which suboptimal 
results can still occur. This paper will attempt to distinguish 
the conditions in which the private trading institutions will fail 
from those in which they will be more successful. Particular 
attention will be paid to those cases in which al l firms real ize 
that they wil l be strictly better off by playing the game cooperatively . 
When this is true, the existence of trading agreements suggests 
that their evolution is a natural or expected institutional adaption. 
II. THE BASIC MODEL 
Referring again to Figure 1, consider a tract of land 
under which there is a geological structure s .  Suppose that the 
surface projection of S (represented by the dotted line) is divided 
in terms of ownership between two different tracts, one owned by 
firm A and the other by firm B. Because of this overlap, it will 
be assumed that the two tracts are informationally related 6 and 
that each firm has precisely two ways of obtaining information 
about its own tract : i) drilling a w ildcat exploration well 
whose information is nonexcludable, or ii) free- riding off of the 
information provided if the other firm drills a wildcat exploration 
well. 
Such information overlaps are common in oil field exploration. 
The problems caused by the resulting externality are well recog-
6 
niz ed by oilmen. For example, John R. Kennedy (1976) remarks 
that "if we ignore the w ildcat-contribution problem we invite 
either bankruptcy or the near termination of exploratory drilling" 
(p. 88). Grayson (1960) has described certain cooperative ins­
titutions, broadly called trading institutions, in which the 
value of the information externalities are specifically con­
sidered by the participants. Four commonly used institutions are: 
1) the " dry hole contribution" in which firm X agrees to drill 
a well , and firm Y agrees to pay firm X money if the well 
turns out to be a dry hole. 
2) the "bottom hole contribution" in which Y pays X regard­
less of the outcome of the well that X has agreed to drill. 
3) the "acreage contribution" l ike 1) or 2), but acreage, 
rather than money, is exchanged. 
4) the "joint venture" in which the firms combine their 
operations over the tracts. 
It is of course clear that these institutions differ 
from one another in many ways, not the least of which is the 
manner in w hich they share their risks. For this paper, how­
ever, they will be collapsed into a general, abstract cooper­
ative institution in which the firms agree to behave in a 
certain prescribed manner, and in which there may be an ex­
change of money between them. The question to be addressed is 
�hether these cooperative institutions completely remedy any 
potential market failure caused by the externality. 
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The game form which will be used to model the firms' 
conflict will consist of two players (firms A and B) each with 
two strategies : i) drill an exploration well today (D) ; or ii) 
hold out until tommorrow (ND) . The firms will be assumed to be 
expected profit maximizers. The "payoffs" of the games will be 
discounted expected profits. The normal form representation of 
the game is depicted in Figure 2 .  Relationships among the values 
of the entries in the payoff matrix will be set according to 
different axiom sets in order to create different games. 
The payoffs to the firms are discounted expected profits. 
From the very beginning it has been posited that oil expl oration 
is a risky undertaking. Implicit, then, in the 2 X 2 normal form 
representation of the games is an expanded game in which "nature" 
is a player via a random variable, 8, w hich describes the presence 
or lack of oil. In this model, information about 8 comes only 
through drilling into the reservoir. 
To illustrate the role of " nature's" play , consider the 
following example in which there are two states of the world: 8 1 
in which there is oil under both tracts and 82 in which there is 
oil under neither tract. 
Let: v6 be the discounted stream of earnings to firm j of a 
successful well drilled today . 
vi = the discounted stream of earnings to firm j of a successful 
well drilled tomorrow 
c6 = the cost to firm j to drill a well today.
D 
A 
ND 
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EITA(D, D) ; EITB(D , D) EITA(D, ND) ; EITB(D, ND)
EITA(ND, D) ; EITB(ND, D) EITA(ND, ND) ; E�(ND, ND)
EIT. (i, k) = optimal discounted expected profits of J 
firm j when firm A uses strategy i and firm B uses 
strategy k. 
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cj 1 the discounted cost to firm j of drilling a well tomorrow. 
¢ 
l 
prob. of el, (1 - ¢1) = prob. of 82. 
Then, referring back to Figure 2, the optimal payoffs to firm Al 
can be calculated as follows: 
EITA (D, D)
EITA (D, ND) = ¢1 (� - C� 
EITA(ND,D) = ¢1(� - C� + (1 - ¢1)(0) ¢1 (� - C�) 
EITA(ND, ND)
¢1 (� - c� 
The structure of EITA(ND, D) is important. By waiting 
until the other firm has drilled, firm A can avoid the cost C� 
of drilling a structure known to be dry . The same relationship 
holds for firm B w aiting until firm A has drilled. 
Other more complicated models of uncertainty are possible 
(continuous outcomes, or the possibility that one well will 
be dry while the other procedures) . The concept of the cal-
culation of expected profits for each strategy choice remains 
the same. 
Each of the noncooperative games will be considered in 
terms of existing solution concepts from the literature on game 
theory. It is hoped that this w ill capture the outcomes which 
a player (firm) would reasonably expect to occur if the games are 
9 10 
noncooperative. Then, this expected noncooperative outcome, a 
type of threat point, will be compared with the possible outcomes 
when the same games are played cooperatively , with side pay ments. 
When the analogous solution concepts, or " reasonable" outomes, of the 
cooperative game present the opportunity for both players to have 
strictly higher payoffs than at the noncooperative outcome, then it 
is argued that the existence of these trading institutions is a 
natural response,to the information externality . 
Implicit in the consideration of the cooperative game 
is a " bargaining" process which allocates the surplus obtained 
from cooperative play. It will be assumed that the bargaining 
mechanism is taken as a given, and that all participants recog-
nize that when there are gains from cooperation, the mechanism 
will make all players strictly better off. 
III. THE NONCOOPERATIVE GAME 
The general game form of the preceeding section (see 
Figure 2) will be transformed into five specific games by choos-
ing assumptions about the relationships among the payoff entries. 
However, throughout this section, the following assumptions will 
be maintained: 
Al: The " game" does not continue after tomorrow. Both firms 
realiz e that if they both hold out (ND) until tomorrow, they 
will have to make their " drill/don't drill" decision based 
solely upon their own actions. 
A2: Either well drilled individually today or tomorrow would 
earn nonnegative profits. If both firms hold out until 
tomorrow, the returns will be such that both firms decide 
to drill. 
A3: If one firm drills today (D), its profits are unaffected 
by whether or not the other firm drills. This assumption 
requires that: 
EIIA (D, D) EITA (D,ND) 
for firm A 
EIIB (D, D) EIIB(ND, D )  for firm B 
A4: Information is socially valuable in that the maximum of joint 
discounted expected profits occurs through sequential drilling 
(either (D, ND )  or (ND , D )), and the information is privately 
valuable in that each firm would, if holding out, prefer to 
receive than not receive it. 
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That information is socially valuable can be seen to be a restriction 
on the relationship between revenues and costs in periods 0 
and 1. The assumption requires that the maximum of discounted 
joint expected profits is either 
<P1 (V�) - C� + <P1 (V� - C�) = (A drills first and B observes 8): 
or 
<P1 (V�) - C� + ¢1 (� - C�) (B drills first and A observes 8). 
Information is privately valuable in that 
EIT
A
(ND , D )  > EITA(ND , ND ); and 
EITB(D , ND )  > EITB(ND , ND ). 
There are five two-person games, formed by assuming 
more structure on the relationship among payoffs, which are of 
particular interest. In analyzing these non-cooperative games, 
the solution concept which will be considered to be the 
"reasonable" outcome is the "solution in the weak sense" 
(Luce and Raif fa) (see discussion relevant to these specific 
games in Appendix I). 
Game 1: HOLDOUT/HOLDOUT 
Consider the following assumptions: 
AS: Given that the other firm holds out, a firm is indifferent 
between drilling today and holding out until tomorrow, i.e. 
EITA(D, ND) EITA(ND, ND) or 
12 
EITB(ND, D) EITB (ND, ND)
A6: Given that the other firm drills, a firm would rather hold 
out and receive the information than drill. 
EITA(ND, D) > EITA(D, D), or 
E� (D, ND) > E� (D,D)
The axiom structure [Al, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6] for both 
firms yields the normal form represented in Figure 3. Holding 
out (ND) is a dominant strategy for each firm, so (ND, ND) is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium. (ND, ·ND) is also the only strong 
Nash equilibria and the solution in the weak sense. 
A similar result obtains if A5 is replaced by 
A7: Given that the other firm holds out, the firm would rather 
hold out itself, i. e. 
EITA(D, ND) < EITA(ND , ND) or 
EITB(ND, D )  < EITB(ND, ND)
This may occur because the firm's development policy 
would require expensive "holding" of this resource if explored 
today, or because the firm is waiting for valuable information 
from another source. 
13 
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r, t 
t > s 
u > r 
r, s 
ND 
1, 3 
1, 1 
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In the structure [Al, A2, A3, A4, A6, A7] for each firm, 
(call it game l') (ND, ND) is the dominant strategy equilibrium, 
as well as the only Nash equilibrium and the solution in the 
weak sense. (See Figure 4) . This is essentially the Siglitz (1975 ) 
game form. 
GAME 2 
Suppose the relationship between drilling today and 
drilling tomorrow when the other firm holds out is changed from 
A5 to AB : 
AB : Given that the other firm doesn't drill, the firm prefers 
drilling today to drilling tomorrow i. e. 
EITA(D, ND) > EITA(ND, ND ) j  or
EITB(ND, D)  > EITB (ND, ND)
That is, absent the possibility of receiving a free good 
(information) , the firm prefers to drill today. This could be 
due to costs of waiting such as lease payments, renegotiation 
deadlines, etc. However, when assumption A6 still holds, any 
waiting costs must be small enough so that the firm will still 
prefer to hold out if it knows that it will receive valuabl e 
information. If this modification holds for only one firm, while 
the other firm is described by AS or A7, rather than AB, the axioms 
D 
A 
ND 
D 
A 
ND 
D 
r, s 
u, s 
D 
1, 1 
3,1 
FIGURE 4 
GAME l' 
B 
EXAMPLE 
B 
ND 
r, t 
p, q 
ND 
1, 5 
2, 2 
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t > q > s 
u > p > r 
firm is described by A5 or A7 rather than A8, the axioms 
[Al, A2, A3, A4, AS or A7, A6] for A, and 
A[l, A2, A3, A4, A6, A8] for B 
result in a normal form game such as in Figure 5. 
The choice facing firm B is now seemingly now more com-
plicated. If A drills today, B would rather hold out; if A holds 
out, B would rather drill. However, a simple behavioral assump-
tion is that firm A will never drill today, because A'a dominant 
strategy is to hold out. Under the assumption that this is a 
7 
game of complete information, B recognizes A's dominant strategy ,  
17 
and chooses his best response, D. Therefore, (ND, D)  is the solution 
in the weak sense. 
GAME 3: BATTLE OF THE SEXES 
If A8, rather than A5, holds for each firm, the analysis 
becomes substantially more complicated. The general form is 
represented in Figure 6 along with a more illustrative numerical 
example. 
Neither player has a dominant strategy .  There are three 
Nash equilibrium points: (D, ND) and (ND, D) are strong Nash 
equilibria, and there is a weak Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies (in the example in Figure 6, the mixed strategy equilib-
rium is (probability of D = 1/2 probability of ND = 1/2) played 
by A and B) . 
Formally, because the Nash equilibrium pairs are neither 
equivalent nor interchangeable, this game is not solvable in any 
A 
A 
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FIGURE 5 
GAME 2 
B 
D ND 
with 
D r, s r, t 
u > p > r 
t > s 
ND u, s r, z 
s > z 
EXAMPLE 
B 
D ND 
D 1, 1 1, 1.4 
ND 2, 1 1, .4 
FIGURE 6 
Game 3 
B 
D ND 
D r,s r,t 
A 
ND u,s w,z 
Exam� 
B 
D ND 
--
D 1,1 1,2 
A 
ND 2,1 0,0 
with 
r > w 
s > z 
t > s 
u > r 
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of the standard definitions. That the familiar concept of an 
equilibrium point fails to define a "reasonable" outcome can 
also be seen by a less formal analysis. Because the Nash 
equilibria are not equivalent, simply restricting attention to the 
20 
set of equilibrium points does little to remove the element of 
conflict from the game. Firm A would strictly prefer to have the 
equilibrium (ND, D) , w hile B would like (D, ND) . Because the equilib­
ria are not interchangeable, there is no guarantee that the players 
in the noncooperative setting can reach an equilibrium point even 
if they want to. Suppose A wants the equilibrium (ND, D) , and 
so plays ND. If B wants the equilibrium (D, ND) and plays ND , 
the result is the outcome (ND, ND) w hich is not an equilibrium. 
In fact, by attempting to play either the mixed Nash equilibrium 
strategy or the favorable pure Nash equilibrium strategy, each 
firm faces the possibility (if the other firm plays something 
else) of receiving a lower payoff than by playing the maximin 
strategy which maximiz es the minimum possible payoff (in the 
example game, that strategy is to drill today, for a "security 
level" of 1) . In fact, the maximin strategy dominates the 
mixed equilibrium strategy .  O f  course, the disappointing 
truth is that the joint maximin outcome (D, D) is not in equilib­
rium. 
There is one other possible way to describe the outcome 
of this noncooperative game. One can suppose that, given the 
absence of a well defined solution in the standard sense, each 
firm simply attempts to maximiz e its expected payoff based upon 
21 
some subjective probability distribution over the strategy choices 
by the other firm. We will return to the problems such a situation 
can cause in a later section. 
GAME 4 :  
Finally, there is the possibility that for one firm 
AB holds but not A6. Rather, the value of the drilling information 
to one firm is not enough to persuade it to hold out, even if it 
knows that the other firm intends to drill. This is expressed as A9
8
. 
A9: EITA(ND,D) .::_ EITA(D,D) for firm A. or 
EITB(D,ND) .::_ EITB(D,D) for firm B. 
If this is true for only one firm, say firm A, the 
result is as in Figure 7 ,  represented by the axioms 
For A: [Al, A2 , A3, A4, AS, A9] 
For B: [Al, A2 , A3, A4, A6, and either A5, A7, or AS] . 
Firm A has a dominant strategy to drill today. Firm B, 
recogniz ing this, would hold off. This game is solvable in the 
weak sense at (D,ND ) . 
VI. THE NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES AND THE QUESTION OF OPTIMALITY 
In only one of the five games in the previous section 
w ill the socially optimal (in this case, joing profit maximiz ing) 
drilling pattern necessarily result. In games 1, and l', a 
D 
A 
ND 
D 
A 
ND 
I 
I 
D 
r,s 
u, s 
FIGURE 7 
GAME 4 
B 
ND 
r, t 
w, z 
EXAMPLE 
B 
D ND 
1, 1 I 1, 1. 1 
.9,1 I .1, 1.0 
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u < r 
w < r 
s < t 
s > z < t 
u > w 
nonsequential drilling pattern (ND, ND) is the solution. In game 
3- there is no solution, and no guarantee of the appropriate 
drilling strategy. In game 2 ,  the result may not be optimal 
because the solution may be to drill the wells in the wrong order. 
For example, the firm which should efficientl y "hold out" may 
face penalties on its lease if exploratory drilling has not 
commenced. The payoff matrix might look like Figure 8. In 
this example, the game is 2 with a solution (ND, D). However, 
the optimal staggered drilling order is (D, ND). Only in game ,4 
is the noncooperative play optimal. 
in Appendix II.) 
(A proof of this is shown 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF COOPERATIVE DRILLING GAMES 
Different of the four proposed cooperative arrange­
ments may be appropriate under different circumstances. If the 
noncooperative result is that both firms hold out, a dry hole 
contribution, bottom hole contribution, or acreage contribution 
could induce one firm to drill. For the other cases, a joint 
venture or a combination of proposals might be suggested. 
Yet the two critical characteristics of any cooperative 
play of the drilling game are that i) the firms are allowed the 
opportunity to communicate and coordinate their drilling 
strategy and ii) the firms can make "side payments" that is, 
transfers of cash or acreage. 
The total net profit to each firm from a coordinated 
drilling strategy will be the profit from its own property plus 
2 3 
D 
A 
ND 
FIGURE 8 
B 
D ND 
1.4, . 9  1. 4, 1.2 
1.6, .9 1.4, .8 
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the net total of all side payments (which may be positive or 
negative) . 
Thus, there are two important choices to be made in 
the cooperative play of the game: i) the drilling strategies 
to be chosen, and ii) the side payments to be arranged. 
25 
The theory of cooperative game solutions is built upon 
two fundamental concepts: i) the coalition, and ii) the charac-
teristic function. Let I be the set of all players. A coalition 
C is a subset of I w hich agrees to a joint strategy. The charac-
teristic function of a game, call it V(S) , is a set function map-
ping subsets of I (coalitions) into the real numbers. The charac-
teristic function denotes "the joint payoff which the members of 
any given coalition (S ::_ I) would achieve if they did cooperate 
among themselves but did not cooperate with the remaining players" 
(Harsanyi, 1977, pp. 213). A characteristic function has the 
properties that V(¢) = 0, and 
V(R U S) 2_ V(R) + V(S) \fR, S c I 
(That is, two groups can always do at least as well by acting 
together as by acting separately.) 
For the two person drilling games in this paper, the 
concern is with V(A) , V(B) , and V(A + B) . V(A) and V(B) are 
the payoffs each firm would get by acting alone. As has been 
shown in the previous section, however, this concept is neither 
simply nor unambiguously defined. Many game theorists have ad-
opted the convention that V(i) is person i's maximin value, 
that is, how much the one person coalition of i can guarantee if 
all other players (firms) turn against him. [See, for example, 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (195 3), pp. 538-564. ) The question 
that needs to be asked here is how this general adoption of the 
maximin concept squares with some of the "reasonable" outcomes 
presented in the previous section. Unfortunately, all is not well 
as the following lemmata (about two person games) demonstrate: 
Lemma 1: 
Proof: 
Lemma 2: 
Proof: 
Let a* be a dominant strategy for player j; then, 
a"' is also a maximin strategy. 
If a* is not maximin 3 some strategy pair (a, S) such 
that EII.(a, S) > EIT.(a*, S) -++ . J J 
Let (a*, S*) be a dominant strategy equilibrium. Then, 
A 
for each player j, EIT.(a*, S*) > V(j) if V(j) is the 
J -
maximin characteristic function. 
If, say, V(A) > EITA(a*, S*) then 3 a strategy a such 
that EITA(a, 6'') > EITA(a, S*) -++ 
Lemma 3: Let (a*, 8*) and V(j) be defined as in Lemma 2. It 
can be true that for both players, EIT.(a*, S*) > V(j) 
J 
26 
Proof: Consider 
D 
D 10, 10 
A 
ND 2 
/\ /\ 
' 
4 
B 
V(A) = V(B) = 4 
a* = D, 8* = D 
ND 
4 '2 
2 2 , 
ETIA(D, D )  ETIB(D, D )  10 
Lennna 4: If A has a dominant strategy a*, and 8 is B's "best 
response, " 8 need not be B's maximin strategy. 
Proof: Consider 
D B 
/\ 
ND a* = D, 8 = D, 
27 
D 100, 10 100, 4 I but B' s maximin 
A 
I strategy is ND. 
ND 4, 0 4, 4 
Lemma 5 :  If the pair (a',8') is the "solution in the weak sense," 
Proof: 
ETI. (a', 8') > V(j) Vj where V(j) is the maximin value. 
J -
Suppose V(A) > ETIA(a',8'). Then, 3 a 3 ETIA(a', 8') < ETIA(a, 8'). 
But, then, (a', 8') is not an equilibrium in the reduced game ++-
Lemma 6: Let a' , 8', & V(j) be defined in Lemma 5 ,  then it is 
Proof: 
possible that for both players ETI.(a', 8') > V(j) 
J 
Consider 
28 
B (D, D) is the solution 
D ND 
in the weak sense. 
D 80, 4 A 100, 5 
A 
V(A) = 80 < ETIA(D, D) = 100 
A 
ND 4, 0 4, 4 V(B) = 4 < ETIB(D, D) = 
All of the games developed in the previous section, except G3, 
have either dominant strategy equilibria or solutions in the weak 
sense (a dominant strategy equilibrium is also a solution in the 
weak sense). The maintained behavioral proposition of this paper 
is that if both players see that the cooperative play makes them 
better off, then the cooperative institutions are a "natural re-
spouse. " 
5 
However, this leaves a key conjectural ambiguity. How does 
player A believe that player B will respond? In the context simply 
of noncooperative play, the reasoning behind solutions such as the 
solution in the weak sense suggests that if firm A has a dominant 
strategy, firm B recognizes this, and (despite any preplay threats) 
B believes A will ultimately choose to play his own dominant strategy. 
As was previously mentioned, however, when dealing with cooperative 
games, the reasoning typically begins with the concept of the best 
someone can do if everyone else turns against him. 
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As was demonstrated in Lemma 5, the divergence between the 
maximin characteristic function and the weak solution is asymmetric. 
The payoff at the solution in the weak sense is always at least as 
great as the maximin characteristic function. This is intuitive. No 
player will ever consider a "reasonable" outcome one which pays less 
than the same player would guarantee himself regardless of the outcome 
of others. However, as shown in Lemma 6, there is the possibility 
that the outcome at the solution in the weak sense pays each player 
more than the maximin characteristic function value. 
The problem for this analysis is that by underevaluating V(i), 
one runs the risk of overstating the potential for cooperative play. 
Therefore, the following alternate characteristic function, V0(S), 
for games with a solution in the weak sense, is proposed: 
•V0(<1>) = 0
•Vo (j) ETI.(a,S) where (a,S) is the solution in the weak 
J 
sense of the noncooperative game, (j = A,B). 
•V0(A U B) = the maximum of joint profits obtained 
from an efficient drilling schedule. 
(Note that V0(S) fulfills the conditions that 
V0(<1>) = 0 
V0(R US) � V0(R) + v�(S) VS c I). 
In terms of the drilling games developed in the previous section, 
the potential for cooperative institutions occurs when each firm 
sees itself being better off at the outcome of cooperative play 
then at the "reasonable outcome" of noncooperative play. In the 
setting of cooperative games, the first criterion which will 
be adopted for a "reasonable" outcome is that it is in the "core. " 
That is, let X (EIT!,ETI:B) be a vector of final net expected 
profits to the firms. X is in the core if 
i) EITX + ETIB 
ii) EITX � V0 (A) 
.ii) E� > V0 (B) 
V(A U B) 
The previously developed restriction on the definition 
of the bargaining mechanism can be formally stated as a second 
criterion on a proposed outcome X. 
If x (TIX,ITB) and 
TIX+ ITB > V0(A) + V0 (B) 
then ITX > V0(A); TIE > V0 (B) 
JO 
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That is, both firms will be made strictly better off when cooperative 
play procedures greater joint expected profits than noncooperative 
play. Other " fair" properties of bargaining mechanisms are dis-
cussed in Harsanyi and Luce and Raiffa. A specific example of a 
bargaining scheme is given by Kennedy. 
Because of the implicit bargaining procedure, the 
possibility of an extended bargaining game (see Luce and Raif fa 
pp. 140-143) must be addressed. In an extended bargaining game, 
the firms would list moves in the noncooperative game as binding 
threats, say dA and dB. Then the outcome (dA,dB) would become the 
threat point for the bargaining mechanism. In Harsanyi's terms, 
the noncooperative threat game becomes "dependent" on the bar-
gaining game. However, it will be assumed here that firms cannot 
make binding threats. In Harsanyi's terms, the noncooperative 
conflict game is "independent" of the bargaining game. The 
"threat point" or expected outcome will be determined strictly 
by the noncooperative play as outlined in the previous section, 
9 
and not by any preplay nonbinding threats made by the firms. 
So, for games 1, l', 2, and 4 the "solution in the weak sense" will 
still be considered the expected noncooperative outcome. 
In the four games with a weak solution in non-
cooperative play, the important policy conclusion is that the 
incentives for joint action (V0(A U B) > V0(A) + V0(B)) occur 
precisely when the expected result of noncooperative play is 
inefficient. Furthermore, when this occurs, there is some 
outcome in the core (chosen by a bargaining mechanism) that makes 
both firms strictly better off than noncooperative play. If 
activating these institutions is costless, then the existence of 
the information externality is not � � an argument for an 
exploration subsidy in these cases. 
When the maximin characteristic function, call it V(S), 
is used, this implication runs only in one direction. When the 
solution is nonoptimal, firms recognize the gains from joint action. 
However, in game 4, Figure 7, (D, ND) is the solution in the w eak 
sense but V(A U B) > V(A) + V(B). 
However, there is still the case of game 3. It is quite 
possible that no reasonable characteristic function exists for this 
game. In the example in Figure 6, the maximin outcome is (D, D) with 
a payoff (1, 1). If each firm views its maximin value as the "threat 
point" payoff, V(j), then each firm will recognize the potential 
gains from cooperative play, as V(AUB) > V (A) + V(B). But (D , D )
is not an equilibrium, and it is not unreasonable to suspect that 
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there are conditions in which one expects a greater payoff. However, 
suppose we create a function V'(j) which is the amount j "expects" to 
receive from noncooperative play (with j's expectation based upon his 
own subjective evaluation of his opponents strategy). There is 
always the possibility that each firm is (incorrectly) convinced 
that it can bluff out the other; each plays the strategy ND, and 
V'(A) + V'(B) = (2) + (2) > V(A U B) (the efficient outcome). 
Neither firm would initiate cooperative play, and a promoter 
attempting to put together a deal would be frustrated by the 
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firms' attitudes. In such a situation, noncooperative play leads 
to a suboptimal result, but private cooperative action would fail. 
VI. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As is to be expected, "real world" circumstances diverge 
from the assumptions of the model in a way which requires some 
special attention. 
First, it has been assumed that activating the cooperative 
institutions is costless. If it is not, then voluntary cooperation 
may fail even w hen these models indicate that it would succeed. 
The problem of institutional cost is undoubtedly exacerbated as 
the number of firms goes from 2 to N. Locating lease owners, 
coordinating the discussions, etc. becomes more costly. Further­
more, the game analysis becomes more complicated as firms have 
the opportunity to be "free riders" off of the drilling negotiations 
of others. For example, firms Z and W want Y to pay X to drill, 
etc. A classic public goods· problem results if no firm views 
its own increase in expected prof its from going along with the 
promoter's deal as being greater _than its costs in the deal. 
This "public goods" problem suggests that the presumption for 
public intervention is greater as lease ownership patterns 
are more fragmented. 
On the other hand, there is another factor which may 
make voluntary contributions more attractive than presented in 
this paper. It may be the case that the information externality 
is very imperfect; that is, the "free rider" firm gets some 
information, but not as much as from actually drilling the well. 
The legal contract for cooperative ventures typically specifies 
that all pertinent information (drilling logs, electrical logs, 
drill stern tests, drilling core results, etc.) must be given to 
all parties. If such detailed information is sufficiently more 
valuable than "free rider" information, a promoter may convince 
both firms in game 3 that cooperation is profitable, or provide 
an extra incentive to firms in the N firm case to be participants 
in the venture. 
VII. SUBSID IES AND !1ARKET FAILURE 
Several cases have been identified in which the potential 
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for market failure is present even when the possibility of a cooperative 
exhcange institution is allowed. Therefore, the concerns raised by 
Peterson and Stiglitz are still valid. Among the nonmarket solutions 
suggested by each is a program of government subsidies for exploration. 
However, the model developed here can be used to show that some 
subsidy schemes can make matters worse. 
Consider the "battle-of-the-sexes" drilling game, game 3, 
as depicted in Figure 8. There exists a subsidy scheme for which 
an optimal drilling strategy obtains and for which the increase in 
profits is greater than the cost of the subsidy. This is achieved 
by paying either A or B a $ (1 + E) subsidy for drilling today, and 
informing the other firm so that it may hold out. However, the 
subsidy must be selective. If a general blanket subsidy program of 
$(1 + E) is adopted, both firms drill today, and a suboptimal 
result (D , D )  obtains. In fact, the gain in total profits is less 
than the final cost of the subsidy . Furthermore, a general subsidy 
could make matters worse if it interfered in the operation of the 
private cooperative agreements in those situations in which the 
private agreements are effective. The key point is that market 
failure does not arise merely from too little drilling today ; 
it may also derive from improperly sequenced drilling. 
Unfortunately, the information requirements for the appro­
priate selective subsidy are tremendous. As Stiglitz (1975 , p. 94) 
suggests, there are other approaches which should be considered. 
Among the possibilities are imposed joint venture expl oration with. 
a single operator, some variant of an "incentive compatible" sy stem 
for providing public goods, or changes in l easing policy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Recommending public subsidies for oil exploration based 
on information externalities overlooks the existence of private 
cooperative institutions designed to facilitate cooperative dril-
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ling strategies. It was shown that under several reasonable 
conditions, private cooperative institutions are a natural result of 
the derived two-person drilling game. However, there are other 
situations in which there is no guarantee that suboptimal non­
cooperative behavior will induce firms to efficient drilling patterns. 
This occurs when the drilling game is of the "battl e-of-the-sexes" 
type. The appropriate selective subsidy would be an appropriate 
remedy in this case. A general subsidy could improve results or 
make matters worse. 
As the number of firms goes from 2 to N, the costs of 
organizing increase, and additional free rider problems arise. 
However, it may also be the case that participation in cooperative 
drilling provides the firm with "better" information than from being 
a free rider. The first of these modifications makes cooperative 
less likely to succeed; the second improves the prospects for an 
optimal agreement. 
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APPENDIX I 
The solution concept adopted here is the "solution 
in the weak sense" of Luce and Raiffa (pp. 106-109) . For the 
two-person, two-pair strategy games of this paper, it is imper-
tant to note the following: 
1) A dominant strategy equilibrium is a solution in the weak
sense (it is the only strategy in the reduced games, so it 
is trivially an interchangeable, equivalent equilibrium 
in admissible pairs, thus a solution in the strict sense of 
the reduced game) . 
2) When one firm plays a dominant strategy, a', and the other 
firm plays a best response, S', the pair (a',S') is the 
solution in the weak sense. (Again, trivially, (a',S')
is admissible in the reduced game, and it is the only equilib-
rium in the reduced game.) 
D ominance in this paper is used in the following sense: 
a dominates a' if and only if 
[EIT.(a,S') > EIT.(a',S')] \IS' 
J - J 
with> holding for at least one S'. a is a dominant strategy 
if it dominates all other strategies. 
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APPENDIX II 
Lemma: The solution in the "weak sense" of game 4 is the social optimum 
Proof: Game 4 is 
D 
D r,s 
A 
ND u,s 
The solution is (D,ND) . 
B 
ND 
r,t 
w,z 
u < r 
w < r 
u > w 
s < t 
> 
s < z < t 
t > s so (D,D) cannot be an optimum. Likewise r > u rules out 
(ND,D) . Finally r > w, t > z eliminates (ND,ND) . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. When production decisions must be made ex ante, information 
can be used to improve production choices in a way which 
increases expected profits. (See Hirshleifer, 1971). 
2. In fact, the complete profile of the structure may not be 
known until the entire production history of the well is
complete, if then. But, Kennedy (1976) says, "Any wildcat
has some value .... At the very worst, they establish 
that y es, the granite is indeed only 300 ft. below the sur­
face, and every body can now drop their acreage in the area 
and get on with better things. At the very best, a sig­
nificant new discovery is made, and everybody can now start 
hustling for rigs and tubular goods." 
3. See especially Arrow (1974).
4. Peterson (197S) gives an example from the Alaska North Slope. 
S. In a later paper, Peterson (1978) mentions these institutions 
in a footnote, but dues not incorporate them in his analysis. 
6. This paper will not consider the more general topic of pro­
duction externalities between the properties. 
7. "Complete" information is defined here to mean that each 
player knows the strategies and associated payoffs available 
to the other play ers. 
8. Given A3 and A4, if AS or A7 holds rather than AS, A9 cannot hold. 
To see this, consider A's pay offs 
B 
D ND 
D r r 
A 
ND u w 
AS or A7 => w > r. 
A4 => u > w 
=> u > r which contradicts A9. 
It is also true that given A3, if A9 holds for both firms, 
then A4 cannot hold. Consider 
B 
D ND 
D r,s r,t 
A 
ND u,s w,z 
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By A9 r � u, s > t. By A4 (the second part) u > w, t > z and 
(D , D) is the social maximum -++ 
9. Kennedy relates that the principal difficulties he has 
experienced in dry hole contribution bargaining were:
"l. Operators proposing a test will have generally tried 
to argue a gross exaggeration of the value of the test to 
owners of surrounding acreage, w hile at the same time pre­
tending to ignore its value for their own acreage in the
area outside the drilling unit. 
2. Nonoperator acreage owners around the proposed test 
have carried on a similar charade, pretending to virtual 
indifference as to whether the well is drilled, y et perversely 
insisting on its great value to acreage owners in the drill 
site unit. " 
Kennedy's article is, in fact an exposition of a 
particular bargaining mechanism, based on distance from the 
drill site. 
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